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Domestic abuse2 is a social issue of concern to individuals and policy makers alike. The magnitude
of the problem may be surprising: estimates from the Canadian Violence Against Women Survey
(VAWS) indicate that 29 percent of ever-married women (Statistics Canada 1993a, p.4) and 50
percent of divorced women have been victims of abuse.3 Two of the most troubling aspects of
domestic violence are the following patterns of behavior documented in the psychology literature
(Walker 1979). First, abusive relationships are characterized by a ‘cycle of violence,’ where tension
builds up until violence occurs, the abusive husband repents so his wife stays in the marriage, and
the process repeats itself with ever-increasing violence. Second, battered women are characterized by
‘learned helplessness,’ where abused wives begin to learn what is going to happen to them through
the cycle of violence, but become unable or unwilling to leave an abusive marriage.4
In this paper, we study the behavior of men and women in abusive relationships to determine
what drives some men to abuse their wives and what keeps some women in abusive marriages. We
also study the relationship between employment and domestic violence, as policymakers point to
increased ﬁnancial independence of women as one way to reduce or prevent abuse. We use unique
data, the 1993 VAWS, to document several stylized facts about domestic abuse. The VAWS, which
contains a large, random sample of women, is one of the most representative data sets currently
available on domestic violence.5 This is in direct contrast to most data sources on domestic violence
that contain small, select samples of abused women. Having access to a representative sample enables
us to make comparisons between women who have never been abused, those who were abused in the
past, and those who are currently abused. The data highlight several noteworthy aspects of abuse:
in contrast to conventional wisdom, the VAWS shows that (1) the vast majority of violent marriages
2The expressions domestic abuse and domestic violence shall be used interchangeably in this paper.
3Following the Canadian Criminal Code, the VAWS deﬁnes domestic violence as including any of the following ac-
tivites: threatening to hit, pushing, grabbing, shoving, slapping, kicking, hitting, biting, beating, choking, threatening
to use or using a gun or knife, or sexual assault.
4See, for example, Dutton (1995).
5Several studies outside the economics literature have studied these data extensively. For example, Thompson,
Saltzman, and Johnson (2001) and Ratner (1998) document the determinants of injuries resulting from physical abuse
in the VAWS and the health eﬀects of abuse, respectively. Wilson, Johnson, and Daly (1995) consider the demographic
correlates of domestic violence.end in divorce and (2) many husbands stop abusing their wives before divorce occurs. We also ﬁnd
that (3) the average characteristics of abused wives and abusive husbands are markedly diﬀerent
from their counterparts in non-violent marriages. In particular, abused women and abusive men,
on average, have less education and are more likely to come from violent homes. Finally, there is
evidence of a relationship between abuse and female employment as (4) abused women have slightly
lower employment rates and (5) men are slightly more likely to abuse non-working wives.
We develop a model of domestic violence, divorce, and employment that captures the aforemen-
tioned features of the data. Men and women make decisions sequentially in the model. Women make
marital status decisions taking into account expectations of abuse given their spouse’s characteristics
and past behavior, and men decide whether to abuse taking into account the likelihood their wives
will divorce them. Domestic violence serves two roles for men within the model: men may have pref-
erences over abuse directly and may also use abuse as a mechanism through which to inﬂuence their
wives’ behavior, in particular their employment decisions. Women then make employment decisions
taking into account how their behavior inﬂuences the likelihood of experiencing abuse in the future.
To estimate the model, we use retrospective data from the VAWS on marriage, domestic violence ex-
perienced by women in current and past relationships, violence in the family backgrounds of women
and their spouses, and the female’s current employment behavior. By controlling for observed and
unobserved characteristics and by taking advantage of the, albeit limited, information on the timing
of marriage, abuse and employment, we can determine the extent to which the correlations observed
in the raw data are due to causal relationships.
The results of our analysis reveal the following ﬁndings. First, domestic violence is the most
important factor in divorce decisions: women who are abused are signiﬁcantly more likely to divorce
than women in non-violent marriages. Second, for men observing domestic violence as a child, the
likelihood of abusing one’s own wife is 1.9 − 5.3 times greater, depending on the age of the wife.
This ﬁnding highlights the importance of intergenerational eﬀects of domestic violence.6 Third, we
ﬁnd that employment reduces the likelihood a husband abuses his wife for marriages in which the
wife is under the age of 30. Finally, we ﬁnd no evidence of a causal eﬀect of abuse on employment.
We consider several policy experiments designed to prevent or reduce the occurrence of domestic
6Pollak (2004) provides a theoretical framework for the study of intergenerational violence.
2violence. Three lessons can be drawn from the experiments:
1. The policy experiments highlight an interesting relationship between the timing of abuse and
the deterrent eﬀect of employment: young women are able to reduce the likelihood of abuse
through working, but only before abuse arises in marriage.
2. For women in abusive marriages, working no longer has a large eﬀect on the likelihood she
will be abused in the future, as state-dependence in abuse for husbands overwhelms any eﬀect
of the wife’s employment. Abused women therefore are less likely to use employment as a
means of preventing further abuse. In these cases, policies that make it easier for women to
leave abusive spouses are more eﬀective in ending domestic violence than policies designed to
prevent further abuse within the marriage.
3. The most eﬀective policies for reducing abuse within marriage are those that directly target
the behavior of men. Re-socializing men from violence homes, in particular, is a promising
strategy for preventing domestic violence.
Our work is related to a small but growing literature that studies the economic implications
of abuse. Tauchen, Witte, and Long (1991) were the ﬁrst to model domestic violence within an
economic framework. In their model, husbands maximize utility by choosing the amount of abuse
and income to transfer to their wives, subject to the wives’ reservation utility levels. This framework
has been applied to several data sets to estimate the number of incidents of violence in abusive
marriages (Tauchen, Witte, and Long 1991; Farmer and Tiefenthaler 1997; Kingston-Riechers 1997).
The papers in this literature, while providing an important ﬁrst step in our understanding of domestic
violence, tend to rely on small, select samples of currently married and abused women or samples
of women who contacted the police or visited a shelter. These data likely exclude women who
left abusive relationships after observing their spouse’s behavior and may provide an inaccurate
portrayal of the prevalence of abuse. Others in the literature have studied the eﬀects of abuse
on employment (Lloyd 1997a, 1997b) and the relationship between abuse and divorce (Kingston-
Riechers 2001). While these studies point out important potential eﬀects of abuse, they ignore
the selection into marriage and the relationship between employment and marital status decisions.
Furthermore, domestic violence is also often treated as an exogenous determinant of the female’s
3behavior. These issues all have important consequences for any inference regarding domestic violence
and are addressed in our paper.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the VAWS and presents
a set of stylized facts on domestic violence. The model used to describe the relationship between
abuse, employment, and divorce is described in Section 3, as is the estimation procedure. The
estimation results and policy experiments are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Violence Against Women Survey
The VAWS was conducted between February and June of 1993 and involved telephone interviews of
12,300 women aged 18 and above in all provinces of Canada. The survey collected information on
violence experienced since the age of 16 as well as the respondent’s perception of personal safety. The
VAWS is particularly useful for our purposes in three respects. First, it contains a random sample of
women. This is in contrast to most surveys involving abuse-related subject matter, where samples
tend to be limited to abused women seeking services (Tauchen, Witte, and Long 1991; Farmer and
Tiefenthaler 1997) or to low income families in a restricted geographical area (Lloyd 1997a, 1997b).
Second, all activities considered an oﬀense under the Canadian Criminal Code, reported or not,
were recorded. As a result, the problem of underestimating the prevalence of violence by restricting
responses to reported incidents is reduced. Considering the highly sensitive nature of the survey
questions, the data may still be subject to some degree of under-reporting. It is likely that all women
do not fully disclose abuse to the interviewer out of fear, shame or denial (Okun 1986; Weis 1989;
Straus and Gelles 1992; Dutton 1995). Furthermore, women may be more likely to report abuse
in a past marriage than abuse in a current marriage. It is also possible that non-response to the
survey as a whole may be correlated with abuse. We are not able to directly address this issue.
However, Statistics Canada, recognizing the sensitive nature of the survey, consulted a wide range
of experts while constructing the questionnaire to mitigate the degree of non-response in the survey.
Interviewers were trained to recognize and respond to signals that the respondent was concerned
about being overheard and telephone numbers of local support services were oﬀered to women
reporting current cases of abuse and to women in distress (Statistics Canada 1994b). In addition,
4sensitive questions on the survey were prefaced with statements designed to make the respondent
more comfortable answering the question. As a result of these eﬀorts, it is likely that under-reporting
of domestic violence is diminished to a large extent.7 It is still important to note that if abuse is
under-reported in the VAWS, especially for those women currently in abusive marriages, it may be
the case that the eﬀect of abuse on divorce will have an upward bias. However, it is also important
to note that studies of divorce that do not include information on domestic violence will overstate
the eﬀects of variables, such as education, that are highly correlated with both divorce and domestic
violence.
Third, the data set contains information about the frequency, severity, and timing of abuse in
current and past marriages, as well as information on violence in the family of origin for women and
their spouses.8 In this context, violence in the family of origin refers to whether the respondent or
the spouse observed their father abusing their mother. As noted in the Introduction, domestic abuse
is often treated as an exogenous determinant of outcomes, even though in the same literature it also
is recognized as the outcome of a household decision problem. Information on family background
aids us in studying the simultaneity of these outcomes as it provides a source of exogenous variation
in determining abuse. In addition to information on domestic violence, the VAWS contains stan-
dard information on the personal characteristics of women, including current employment status,
education, and the presence of children.
To conduct our analysis, we impose the following restrictions on the sample. First, the age range
of the sample is restricted to women aged 25 to 55 who are not enrolled in school, eliminating 5,620
women. Any married women with more than two relationships (432) and any currently single women
with more than one relationship (259) are removed, for the data only contain information on the
7A total of 19,309 eligible respondents were contacted, resulting in a response rate of 63.7 percent (Statistics
Canada 1994a). In light of the relatively low response rate, we compared the VAWS with the Canadian Survey of
Consumer Finances (SCF). The average characteristics of women are the same with the exception of the proportion
of women living in urban areas and educational attainments. See Appendix A for further details.
8For the purpose of this paper, women are recorded as married if they report being married and living with their
spouse or if they report living common-law. The VAWS classiﬁes a relationship as common-law if a woman was living
with a man as husband and wife without being legally married (Statistics Canada 1993b). Note that 8 percent of all
currently married women are living common-law.
5current spouse and one past spouse. Any women reporting that they are currently married, are
not separated, but are not living with their spouse (112)9 and widows (87) are eliminated from the
sample. Women who are remarried more than one year (131) are also eliminated from the sample,
as we do not have suﬃcient information on the timing of abuse in the second marriage to estimate
the duration of abuse. Finally, all respondents with missing covariate information are eliminated
(393). The sample size is thus reduced to 5,266 women, of which 8 percent is never-married (single),
74 percent remains in their ﬁrst marriage, 8 percent is divorced and currently single, and 10 percent
is remarried.
For the purpose of our analysis, abuse is deﬁned as an indicator equal to one if the highest
level of reported abuse involves kicking, biting, beating, choking, threatening to use or using a gun
or knife, or sexual assault.10 This deﬁnition of abuse is adopted for two reasons. First, the data
on abuse severity are richer than that on abuse frequency. Abuse severity is split into categories
based on speciﬁc activities, while the frequency data are categorical in nature and top-coded at 11,
limiting their accuracy and usefulness in estimation. Second, in contrast to high severity abuse,
a preliminary analysis of the raw data indicated that frequent, low-severity abuse was not highly
correlated with divorce and employment. Unfortunately, the information on the timing of domestic
violence does not distinguish between high severity and low severity abuse. Therefore, we deﬁne
abuse as an indicator equal to one for women reporting high severity abuse in the marriage and
any abuse during the time period of interest, zero otherwise. Below, we document several empirical
regularities regarding marriage, divorce and domestic violence that are found in the data.
The average characteristics of abused women vary considerably from those of non-
abused women.
A number of past studies on domestic violence rely upon samples of women in abusive marriages
at the time of the survey. Taking this as a starting point, we present statistics for the women that
are married at the survey date in our sample, where the sample is subdivided by the presence of
9This group of women includes those whose husbands might live in another location because of work and are
removed from the sample because of our focus on behavior with the household.
10Information was also collected on lower severity physical abuse including threatening to hit, pushing, grabbing,
shoving or slapping. We limit our analysis to high severity physical abuse as we found that low severity abuse did not
appear to have signiﬁcant eﬀects on marriage and employment decisions in an earlier version of the paper.
6abuse in marriage within the past 12 months. These statistics, presented in Table 1, indicate that
many characteristics of women diﬀer depending on the presence of abuse: women who experience
abuse have lower levels of education and are more likely to come from violent homes than women
who are not abused.11 Abused women also marry earlier and are slightly more likely to have children
than women who have not experienced violence in the past 12 months.
The average characteristics of abusive husbands vary considerably from those of non-
abusive husbands.
The characteristics of abusive and non-abusive husbands in current marriages can also be com-
pared in Table 1. Abusive spouses are much more likely to have violent family backgrounds. This
ﬁnding is consistent with other studies: Strauss, Gelles, and Steinmetz (1980) report that men who
witnessed their fathers abuse their mothers are three times more likely to abuse their wives in a
sample of American couples. Many women report they did not know whether their husbands came
from violent homes. It does not appear that spouses with unknown family backgrounds are more
likely to be abusive in the raw data. Abusive husbands are also more likely to have experienced
unemployment in the past twelve months and are much less likely to have a university education
than non-abusive spouses.
We next consider the joint relationship between marital status, employment, and abuse. Table 2
presents the fraction of women in each marital and employment state, conditional on the presence of
abuse during and prior to the past 12 months. The following facts can be observed from this Table:
Many abusive marriages end in divorce.
The sample of currently married women may not be an appropriate sample of women to consider
when discussing domestic abuse, for women who suﬀered more severe abuse are more likely to
divorce. The fraction of women that are currently divorced is 6 times higher in the sample that was
abused prior to the past 12 months.12 This ﬁnding is surprising in light of the psychology literature
that contends abused women tend to be caught in a cycle of violence and are unable or unwilling to
leave abusive spouses. The statistics in Table 2 likely diﬀer from past studies because of their use
11Fleming (1997) also reports that one-third of abused women witnessed domestic violence against their mothers.
12In fact, while the divorce rate for non-abused women is 12 percent, women who report abuse in a ﬁrst marriage
have a divorce rate of 73% in our data. Lloyd (1997b) also ﬁnds that women who experienced severe abuse are more
likely to be divorced in her data on low-income families.
7of non-random samples. Many psychological studies utilize small samples of women in shelters or in
counselling. Such samples underestimate divorce rates among abused women, as they likely exclude
many women who left relationships after learning of their spouse’s abusive behavior.
Abusive behavior in the past is highly correlated with current abuse; however, many
men stop abusing their wives.
Married women that were abused prior to the past 12 months are 40 times more likely to report
current abuse than women who were not previously abused in their current marriage. Although
there is a high correlation between past and current abuse in the data, it is interesting to note that
only 3 percent of ongoing marriages that were abusive in the past are currently abusive. It therefore
appears to be the case that some men stop abusing their wives before divorce occurs.
Abused women are less likely to work than non-abused women; husbands are less likely
to abuse if their wives are working.
From Table 2 we can compare the likelihood of working amongst married women that were
abused within the past 12 months to those who were not abused, where working is deﬁned as full-
year employment. The statistics indicate that abused women are less likely to choose to work than
women experiencing no current abuse. It appears that women are also less likely to work if the abuse
occurred prior to the past 12 months. Divorced women who were abused in the past marriage exhibit
an employment rate that is 20 percent below that of non-abused divorced women. Comparing the
abuse rates for women that are currently employed, we see that working women are slightly less
likely to experience abuse in the past year than women who are not working. For example, out of
the sample of women that were abused in the past, 9.4 percent of women who are currently not
working are abused while only 8.9 percent (3.48 percent out of 39.2 percent married women abused
in the past) of women who are currently working are abused. This reduced form evidence raises the
possibility of a cycle of violence through employment, where abused women become less likely to
work and as a result are more likely to be abused.
In summary, the sample statistics indicate that standard economic characteristics of women and
their spouses diﬀer across the abused and non-abused samples and that domestic abuse is correlated
with divorce and with female employment. Whether the diﬀerences reported here are due to causal
eﬀects or due to diﬀerences in observed and unobserved characteristics determining who is abused,
8who divorces, and who works is a question we address in the following sections.
3 Model and Estimation
In this section, we present a model that describes the marriage, divorce, abuse, and employment
decisions of households and we show how retrospective information available in cross-sectional data
can be used to estimate the model. Both partners are forward-looking in the model; they take into
account how their actions today will aﬀect their spouse’s decisions, and thus their utility in the
future. To allow for a causal eﬀect of abuse on divorce, women receive disutility from abuse and can
respond to domestic violence by divorcing their spouses in the next period. Thus, a husband must
take into account his wife’s preferences over abuse, and the possibility she will initiate divorce in the
future, when he is deciding whether to be abusive today.
To capture the causal relationship between employment and abuse, we allow employment de-
cisions and abuse to interact in several ways. For one, abuse in the previous period may directly
inﬂuence a wife’s preferences for work in the current period. In addition, as in Tauchen, Witte, and
Long (1991), the husband may both receive utility from abuse directly and use abuse as a way to
inﬂuence the behavior of his wife. The wife, in turn, takes into account the eﬀect of her current
employment decision on the likelihood her spouse is abusive in the next period, a second role for
dynamics in the model.13
The decisions of husbands and wives are modelled in a sequential manner, which simpliﬁes the
dynamic problem of married couples in a natural way. The timing in the model is as follows. Women
make decisions in every odd period and men make decisions in every even period. Individuals receive
a constant level of utility for the period in which they make decisions and for the subsequent period
in which their spouses make decisions. One full period for a couple therefore consists of one odd and
one even period. All agents are single in the ﬁrst period. All single women meet a potential spouse
13The dynamics of labor supply decisions have been found to be important in previous work (e.g., Eckstein and
Wolpin 1989; van der Klaauw 1996), as well as the relationship between current employment and future divorce
(Johnson and Skinner 1986). Unfortunately, these relationships are beyond the scope of this paper as no information
is available in the data on employment histories and labor market experience.
9in every odd period. Women move ﬁrst and decide whether to work (h) or not (n) and whether to be
married (m) or single (s). Denote the choice set for women I = {sn,sh,mn,mh}. After observing
their wife’s employment choice, the husband decides whether to be abusive (a) or not (na) in the
marriage.14 Denote the choice set for husbands J = {a,na}.
3.1 Women
Let uw
t (it,k,jt−1,Mt) denote current period utility for women. Preferences vary with the female’s
current choice (it), her type (k), her spouse’s abuse decision in the previous period (jt−1), and
the couples marital-speciﬁc capital (Mt). The female’s type is described by a vector composed of
two sets of exogenous, time invariant characteristics: characteristics observed by all agents and by
the econometrician that include education, province of residence, the presence of children in the
household, and female’s family background (ko), and characteristics that are observed by the agents
in the model but not by the econometrician (ku).15 Preferences are thus described by:
uw
t (it,k,jt−1,Mt) = ϕh [1(it = sh) + 1(it = mh)] + ϕm [1(it = mn) + 1(it = mh)]
+ ϕmm 1(Mt = 1) + αw
it + γw
it 1(jt−1 = a) + αw
dht 1(dht = 1)
+ λw
it ko + ηw
i ku + εw
it
for it ∈ {sn,sh,mn,mh} and for all odd periods, where 1(·) is an indicator equal to one if the
expression in parentheses is true, εw
it is an idiosyncratic component of utility, and dht is an indicator
equal to one if divorced and working and zero otherwise. The latter is included to allow for diﬀerences
in the utility for single, working versus divorced, working women.16 Mt is an indicator equal to one
if the woman chose marriage in t − 2 and zero otherwise. The utility from the single, not working
state is normalized to zero.
14The employment decision of men is not incorporated in the model: data are only available on the current em-
ployment decisions of currently married spouses, which is not suﬃcient to estimate the male’s joint decision to abuse
and work.
15While most of the characteristics included in ko are time invariant, some are likely to change over time, in
particular the presence of children. However, due to the cross-sectional nature of the data, we do not observe time
variation of individual characteristics, other than age, in the data.
16We suppress dh for notational convenience in what follows.
10Let V w
t (it,k,lt,jt−1,Mt,At) denote the value function for a woman of type k taking decision i
in period t, married to a husband of type lt who made decision j in period t−1. For single women,
each element of the vector lt is equal to zero. At is an indicator equal to one if the female’s husband
was abusive in t − 1 and zero otherwise. The utility currently single and currently married women
receive each period depends on their types and the abuse decisions of their ex-husbands or husbands,
respectively, if married in the previous period.
For married women, the value of choice i in period t is described by:
V w
t (it,k,lt,jt−1,Mt,At) = uw













where β is the discount factor. For single women, the value of choice i in period t is described by:
V w
t (it,k,0,jt−1,Mt,At) = uw












where γ(lt+2) is the probability a single woman meets a potential spouse of type l in period t+2 and
where
P
lt+2∈L γ(lt+2) = 1. Note that for women who do not have a current spouse each element of
l is equal to zero and for women who do not have a previous spouse jt−1 = na, Mt = 0 and At = 0.
The corresponding Bellman equation is:
˜ V w









t (jt,l,it−1,Mt,At) denote current period utility for men. Men have preferences that depend
on their current abuse decision (jt), their type (l), the employment and marital status decision of
their wives in the previous period, marriage-speciﬁc capital (Mt), and their previous decisions to
abuse (At). The husband’s type is composed of two sets of characteristics. The ﬁrst is characteristics
observed by the agents and the econometrician (lo), which consists of the family background of the
11husband.17 The second is characteristics observed to women but not to the econometrician (lu).
Preferences for men taking decision j, married to women taking decision i in t − 1, it ∈ {mn,mh},
are then speciﬁed as:
uh
t (jt,l,it−1,Mt,At) = αh
ijt 1(it−1 = i) + γh
jt 1(At = 1) + γh
mt 1(Mt = 1)
+ λh
jt lo + ηh
j lu + εh
jt,





where the utility from divorce and from being married and not abusive are normalized to zero for
identiﬁcation purposes in estimation.
Let V h
t (jt,l,kt,it−1,Mt,At) denote the value for a husband of type l taking decision j in t,
married to a wife of type kt that made decision i in t − 1. The value of choice j is described by:
V h
t (jt,l,kt,it−1,Mt,At) = uh
























where the Bellman equation for married men is:
˜ V h







17Information on husbands in the data varies across current and past marriages. While there is a reasonable set
of characteristics for current husbands, only limited information exists for past husbands. In particular, for past
husbands the data only contain information on the presence and type of abuse in the past marriage and information
regarding the presence of domestic violence in the past spouse’s family of origin, both of which are also available for
current husbands. Violence in one’s family background is a strong predictor of abuse for men and provides important
exogenous variation that is useful for identiﬁcation.






























where γ(kt+2) is the probability a single man meets a potential spouse of type k. Assuming εw
it and
εh
jt are distributed i.i.d extreme value, the expected response of husbands to their wives’ current























In period T −2, men no longer make decisions but receive utility for one more period. The terminal































if iT−3 ∈ {sn,sh}. In period T − 1, women no longer make decisions and receive no utility in the
future. It is assumed that women move last, so that women always have the opportunity to leave
13a marriage and men always face the threat of divorce when making abuse decisions. The terminal






The solution to the model is based on a set of reservation values. The sequence of reservation values
that form the solution to the problems faced by husbands and wives can be expressed in terms of
the stochastic component of utility. For wives, deﬁne εw∗
it such that women prefer to be single and
not working for values of εw
snt −εw
it above εw∗




it for every state i,i ∈ {sh,mn,mh}; εw∗
it is the value such that
V w
t (i,k,lt,jt−1,Mt,At) + εw
snt − εw
it = V w
t (sn,k,0,jt−1,Mt,At) + εw∗
it
for i ∈ {sh,mn,mh}. Consider two possible states i,i0 ∈ It where It is the choice set available in
period t. Women will choose state i in t if the value of choosing i exceeds the value of choosing state






and the optimal policy is given by:
i =

          




















mht, ∀i0 ∈ It.
Similarly, for husbands, deﬁne εh∗











t (at,l,kt,it−1,Mt,At) + εh
nat − εh
at = V h
t (nat,l,kt,it−1,Mt,At) + εh∗
nat
14for it−1 ∈ {mn,mh}. Men will choose to abuse their wives in t if the value of an abusive marriage















3.5 Using Retrospective Information to Estimate the Dynamic Model
The model described above captures the sequential nature of marital status and abuse choices. If
panel data were available on employment, marriage, and domestic violence, it would be straight-
forward to estimate the full dynamic model. However, the VAWS is a cross-sectional data set with
incomplete information on past decisions. In this section, we show how the retrospective information
available in cross-sectional data can be used to estimate a version of the dynamic model described
above.
The VAWS contains information on age at ﬁrst marriage, the length of the current marriage,
when abuse in the current marriage began and ended, when abuse in a prior marriage ended, and
whether the ﬁrst marriage ended in divorce. This information allows us to create full marital and
abuse histories for women currently in their ﬁrst marriages and for never-married women. However,
the data do not contain suﬃcient information to determine the dates at which abuse began and
marriage ended for women whose ﬁrst marriage ended in divorce. For the latter group, it is necessary
to integrate out those pieces of the marital history that are not observed by the econometrician. It is
also necessary to integrate out the employment history for all women, as information in the VAWS
is only available on the current employment status of women.
To balance the goal of staying as close to the model as possible in estimation against the limita-
tions of the data, we impose the following set of assumptions regarding the timing of events and the
choice sets available to individuals. First, we divide each individual’s life into 5 stages, where each
stage corresponds to 15 years. The ﬁrst stage of life, from age 1 to 15, is an initial stage in which
15individuals do not make any decisions. In the ﬁfth and ﬁnal stage, from age 60 to 75, men receive
utility ﬂows from past decisions but do not make any decisions within the period. Women make a
ﬁnal marriage and employment decision at the very beginning of the last phase, as discussed below.
In the three middle stages, marriage, abuse, and employment decisions are made. Each stage of life
is composed of 4 periods, where women make marriage and employment decisions in odd periods
and men make abuse decisions in even periods. Individuals then receive a constant level of utility
for the period in which they make decisions and for the subsequent period in which their spouses
make decisions. In the model, individuals live for 20 periods, and we estimate a 16 period model for
each man and woman in the sample, starting from age 15.
For simplicity, the following restrictions on the number of decisions within a stage are made:
1. Only three potential spouses are ever available for marriage throughout an agent’s life - one
in each of stages 2, 3, and 4. Potential spouses are only available at the beginning of a stage
and only to those who are not already married.
2. Single women who decide at the beginning of a stage to reject the one available prospective
spouse make only one employment decision, which occurs at the beginning of the stage and
can not be changed until the next stage.
3. Couples who enter a stage married are restricted to a single decision-making period within
the stage. That is, the wife has the opportunity to respond to the last abuse decision of her
husband in the previous stage by divorcing him or not and working or not. If the marriage
stays together, the husband then has the opportunity to respond to his wife’s employment
decision by abusing her or not.
4. At the beginning of the ﬁnal stage, women make marital and employment status decisions in
order for the divorce threat to remain present for the last abuse decision of the husbands. If
a woman decides to stay married to her husband, she carries his last abuse decision with her
throughout the ﬁnal stage. Men do not make any decisions in the ﬁnal stage.
The full sequences of decisions for single women and for married women and their spouses at the
beginning of each stage are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, respectively. Since the data on marital and
16abuse histories is limited, the above simpliﬁcations serve to reduce the number of decisions we must
integrate over when estimating the model. The speciﬁcation outlined above allows us to estimate the
transitions to marriage and divorce, the female’s employment decision, the husband’s decisions to
start and stop abusing his wife, the eﬀect of domestic violence on the current employment decision,
the eﬀect of employment on the abuse decision, and the eﬀect of abuse on divorce. The model is
solved by backwards recursion and the solution to the model is used to construct the likelihood
function.
3.6 Estimation of the Choice Probabilities
The choice probabilities are estimated according to the optimal policies described above. Assume
the idiosyncratic component of preferences is distributed i.i.d. extreme value. The probability that
a man of type l chooses alternative j in period t is:







The probability that a wife of type k chooses alternative i,i ∈ {sn,sh,mn,mh} in period t is







We must account for ﬁve features of the data when constructing the likelihood function. First,
the data do not contain information on past employment decisions. We, therefore, integrate over the
female’s employment decision in all but the current period when estimating the husband’s probability
of abuse. Deﬁne dm as an indicator equal to one if a woman in the sample reports a relationship,
zero otherwise. The probability men abuse their wives in periods prior to the current period is:
Pr(jt = a|l,kt,Mt,At) =
h X
i∈{mn,mh}
Pr(jt = a|l,kt,it−1,Mt,At)Pr(it−1 = i|kt,l,jt−2,Mt,At)
idm
.
Second, for some women who experienced a divorce before the current period, we do not observe
whether they were married or divorced in some of the preceding periods. In these cases, we must
17also integrate over the female’s past marital status:
Pr(it = i|k,lt) =
X
jt−1∈{a,na}









Third, we do not observe the proportion of potential spouses that come from violent homes in
the population and we do not have a random sample of men. However, we do have a random sample
of women; thus, we assume that men are equally likely to come from violent homes as women. The
proportion of all women in the sample from violent homes is 17.48 percent. The probability that
single women choose i in period t is therefore:
Pr(it = i|k) = 0.8252 · Pr(it = i|k,0) + 0.1748 · Pr(it = i|k,1),
i ∈ {sn,sh}. In the data, some women reported that they did not possess information on their
spouse’s family background.18 Instead of excluding these couples, we infer the true type for men
with unknown family backgrounds from the model. In particular, for women who report that the
family background of the spouse is unknown, we assume they observe other characteristics of their
spouses, such as whether the family of origin is dysfunctional in other respects, that are perfectly
correlated with their spouses’ family background and inﬂuence their husbands’ propensity to be
abusive in the same manner. For the purposes of estimation, this assumption implies that the
woman observes her spouse’s type, while the econometrician does not in the absence of information
on family background. We estimate the probability spouses with unknown family backgrounds are
from violent homes (θb). Deﬁne fb to be an indicator equal to one if the husband comes from a
violent family, zero otherwise, and fu an indicator equal to one if the woman does not report her
spouse’s family background. The likelihood contribution for women in period t is therefore:
Pr(it = i|k) =
h









18A total of 388 women reported they did not know whether their ﬁrst spouse witnessed violence in his family of
origin.
18i ∈ {mn,mh}.
Fourth, we integrate out the unobserved types for husbands and wives. We model the unobserved
heterogeneity as follows. Women are allowed to have unobserved preferences over marriage (kumr ∈
{kum1,kum2,...kumR}) and work (kuhr ∈ {kuh1,kuh2,...kuhR}). For identiﬁcation purposes, one type
for each of kum and kuh is normalized to zero. Unobserved heterogeneity in each marital-employment
state for a woman with unobserved type r,r ∈ {1,2,...R} is then given by:
kur =

          
          
0 if i = sn
kuhr if i = sh
kumr if i = mn
kumr + kuhr if i = mh.
The unobserved type of a husband married to a woman of unobserved type r is speciﬁed as:
lur = (ϕm + kumr) δa,
where δa allows for unobserved preferences over abuse to be correlated with the unobserved prefer-
ences for women over marriage. The parameter ϕm enters the unobserved heterogeneity component
so that the gain to abuse is correlated with both intercepts determining the gain to marriage. In
essence, we assume that kumr captures a characteristic of the female that is common to the marriage
and directly aﬀects the husband’s propensity to abuse. We restrict the unobserved heterogeneity
in this way because there is not enough information in the data on second marriages to separately
identify a match-speciﬁc unobserved component and a husband-speciﬁc unobserved component.
Finally, with the exception of unobserved heterogeneity, we allow the preference parameters to
vary across stages but restrict them to be the same for each period within a stage.19 The sample
likelihood is then the product of the joint decisions of husbands and wives, and the individual
decisions of singles, for the entire sample period during which each female is observed, taking into
account the features described above.
19We include age dummies for women aged 30 to 45 and 45 to 60. We restrict the time eﬀect to be the same for
women aged 45 to 60 as for women aged 60 to 75 for identiﬁcation purposes.
194 Results
4.1 Parameter Estimates
Estimates of the preference parameters for the model are presented in Tables 3 to 6. In this instance,
the model is estimated with an annual discount factor ﬁxed at 0.95. For comparison, a myopic version
of the model was also estimated. The results can be found in Appendix B. The myopic version is
equivalent to a multinomial logit framework, representing a reduced form analysis of the data. Later,
we compare the two speciﬁcations when assessing the importance of the dynamic structure of the
model.
Turning to the dynamic results, we ﬁrst consider the determinants of abuse. The preference
parameters for husbands are presented in Table 3. Observing violence as a child signiﬁcantly in-
creases the likelihood of abusing one’s wife (for women under the age of 45) as illustrated in row 3.
Consider the following thought experiment as an illustration of the magnitude of the eﬀect of fam-
ily background on abuse. Take a couple in which the wife is between the ages of 15 and 29. If
we compute the diﬀerence between abuse propensities for men from abusive homes and for men
from non-abusive homes, we ﬁnd that men with violent family backgrounds are 185 percent, 236
percent and 528 percent more likely to abuse their wives when they are aged 15 to 29, 30 to 44,
and 45 to 60, respectively. Witnessing violence as a child reduces the disutility of domestic violence
substantially and conﬁrms the importance of the intergenerational impacts of domestic violence.
The abuse propensity increases substantially with age because men who were abusive in the past
are signiﬁcantly more likely to abuse today. State dependence in abuse is, by far, the single most
important determinant of abuse, as illustrated in row 6. In this respect, the dynamics of abuse
are particularly important and are consistent with anecdotal evidence on escalating violence within
abusive marriages over time. It is also interesting to note that the eﬀect of family background is
insigniﬁcant for marriages in which the wife is aged 45 to 59, suggesting a ﬁrst incident of abuse is
less likely to occur at older ages.
Are abusive husbands responsive to the employment decisions of their wives? The results suggest
that men married to women aged 15 to 29 are signiﬁcantly more likely to abuse if their wives are not
20working. For women aged 30 years and older, the eﬀect of the wife’s employment on her spouse’s
abuse propensity is positive but insigniﬁcant. Since men, if at all, are more likely to abuse non-
working wives, this ﬁnding suggests spouses do not use abuse as a means of keeping their wives
out of the workforce. This result may be picking up the fact that young, non-working wives are
at greater risk of abuse as they spend more time at home. Considering the weak relationship
between employment and abuse for most age groups, the results do not suggest there exists a cycle
of violence through employment within abusive marriages. Upon examination of the marital-speciﬁc
capital parameters for husbands, the eﬀects of abuse, by the employment status of the wife, are
further reinforced in marriages of a longer duration by the fact that marital-speciﬁc capital further
reduces the likelihood of abuse in marriages with working wives and further increases the likelihood
of abuse in marriages with non-working wives.
We next turn to the estimates for women. Is it the case that abused women are unable or unwilling
to leave abusive spouses? The answer is no: the estimated eﬀect of abuse on preferences for marriage
is negative and signiﬁcant for women of all age groups in the model, as illustrated by rows 1 and
5 in Table 4 and row 1 of Table 5. From the parameter estimates, we can compute the diﬀerence
between divorce probabilities when women are in non-violent versus violent marriages and ﬁnd that
15 to 29, 30 to 44, and 45 to 59 year old women who are abused are 245 percent, 565 percent, and
171 percent, respectively, more likely to divorce than women in non-abusive marriages. This result
suggests that women are very responsive to the presence of domestic violence, a ﬁnding contrary
to the common perception that abused women have great diﬃculty leaving abusive relationships.
It is therefore interesting to ask whether the high divorce propensities for abused women have a
deterrent eﬀect on their husbands. To this end, we simulate the model with the discount factor set
to zero and compare abuse rates in marriages for women aged 15 to 29.20 We examine this group as
they have the longest decision horizon and thus likely face the greatest deterrent eﬀects. The results
suggest that there is a deterrent eﬀect of divorce, but abuse rates rise by only 3.5 percent when the
possibility of a future divorce is not taken into account.
We next consider the causal eﬀect of abuse on employment. The results in row 1 of Tables 4
and 5 indicate that domestic violence has positive but insigniﬁcant eﬀect on employment for the
20Results are available from the authors upon request.
21youngest and oldest groups of women who remain married after experiencing abuse, and a negative
but insigniﬁcant eﬀect on those who divorce after experiencing abuse. In contrast, for women aged 30
to 44, abuse has a relatively large and positive eﬀect on employment: abuse results in a 38 percent
increase in employment for women who remain in abusive marriages. It is clear that the reason
abused women have lower employment rates in the raw data has more to do with the characteristics
determining who is abused and who works than with any direct eﬀects of abuse on employment.
For women, a violent family background reduces the value of marriage in general, but the eﬀects
are small in magnitude as compared to the eﬀects of abuse or to the eﬀects of family background
on men. The marital-speciﬁc capital parameters for women are negative, with working preferred
over non-working. The negative sign is due to the fact that divorce can only occur for women
with non-zero marital-speciﬁc capital; thus this parameter captures the net eﬀect of marital-speciﬁc
capital and the gains to divorce. Finally, the estimated probabilities presented at the bottom of
Table 6 indicate that 60 percent of married women reporting they do not know their spouse’s family
background behave as if their spouses have violent backgrounds. This result implies that the initial
distribution of violent backgrounds for men is such that 19.13 percent of men came from violent
homes, which is close to the corresponding 17.99 percent for women in the initial family background
distribution.21
As an illustration of the importance of diﬀerences in exogenous characteristics across abusive
and non-abusive couples, we next consider the predicted behavior of four hypothetical couples of
each age group, presented in Table 7. In couple A, both partners come from non-violent homes, the
wife has at least a post-secondary education, and the couple has no children. In this instance, the
predicted marriage rate is relatively low, in part due to the high value of the female’s time in the
labor market. The overall abuse rate in ﬁrst marriages is low, and those marriages that do become
violent are very likely to end in divorce, as women have favorable outside options in the event the
marriage dissolves. For couple B, we assume both partners come from violent homes, but hold all
other characteristics the same as for couple A. Changing the family background characteristics in
this manner results in a 368 percent rise in abuse rates for women below the age of 30 and a 227
percent rise in abuse rates for women between the ages of 30 and 44. This change is largely driven
21Calculations are available from the authors upon request.
22by the fact that men from violent homes are much more likely to abuse. The decline in marriage
rates and the rise in divorce rates, in both abusive and non-abusive marriages, indicates that women
from violent homes have lower preferences for marriage.
We next consider changing the wife’s education level from post-secondary in couple B to less
than high school to generate the predictions in Column C. The results suggest that women with
lower levels of education are less likely to work. With the exception of women aged 30 to 44, we
ﬁnd these women are also less likely to divorce, as opportunities outside marriage are more limited
for less educated women. As the oldest and youngest groups of women ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to leave
abusive marriages, husbands are more likely to abuse their wives. In contrast, women aged 30 to 44
are more likely to divorce, and in response, their husbands are less likely to be abusive. Education
therefore seems to play an important role in determining which women are abused and which women
are able to leave abusive relationships. Column D presents predictions for couples with children that
are the same in all other respects to the couples in Column C. As is consistent with the literature,
the couples with children have much lower divorce rates, and wives younger than 45 have lower
employment rates, than childless couples. Although women with children prefer to remain married
than to divorce, and men therefore face a lower chance of separation following abuse, abuse rates
are not that diﬀerent between couples with children and couples without children.
The predictions in Table 7 help to provide a picture of how diﬀerences in exogenous character-
istics relate to the diﬀerences highlighted in the raw data. In summary, it appears that the high
divorce rates and the low employment rates of abused married women are driven by diﬀerences in
characteristics that help determine a woman’s opportunities outside the marriage. In particular,
well-educated women and women without children are more likely to work and are more likely to
divorce, suggesting that the characteristics driving the employment decision are also important in
determining who stays with an abusive spouse. In turn, men are less likely to abuse wives that have
better outside opportunities.
The results presented above suggest that variation in observed characteristics, such as education
and family background, can explain much of the diﬀerences in divorce, employment and abuse rates
across couples in the data. The next issue to consider is the importance of unobserved characteristics.
The results in Table 6 suggest that the correlations between abuse, divorce, and employment can not
23be attributed to unobserved heterogeneity: the estimates indicate that the second points of support
for both unobserved preferences for employment and for marriage are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero. This result is robust to a variety of speciﬁcations for unobserved heterogeneity.22 The
loading factor on abuse is negative, as illustrated in Table 3, indicating that abuse is less attractive
when marriage is more attractive to females; however, since there is no unobserved heterogeneity in
preferences over marriage, all men receive the same value for the loading factor. Thus, we ﬁnd the
availability of information on violence in the family of origin to be a good predictor of unobserved
preferences over abuse and divorce, eliminating the importance of unobserved heterogeneity in this
instance.
Table 8 provides evidence on the predictive performance of the model. Considering the limitations
of the data, the model is able to match the dynamics of marital status decisions well. In particular,
the dynamic model matches the fractions married and single in each age grouping, as well as the
high divorce rates for abusive marriages and relatively low divorce rates for non-violent marriages.
We are also able to replicate the fact that employment rates for abused married women are relatively
high for women aged 30 to 44 and relatively low for abused married women aged 45 to 59. The
model has diﬃculty ﬁtting the data in a few dimensions for women aged 30 to 44: we over-predict
the divorce rate in non-abusive marriages, the employment rate for abused women, and the abuse
rate for working women. This is due to the small sample sizes used to estimate some of the choices
in the data: while information on the entire sample of women aged 30 to 44 is used to estimate the
fraction of women currently employed and currently married, only information on women who are
currently working is used to estimate the abuse rate for working women and only information on
women currently abused is used to estimate the employment rate for abused women. The model has
diﬃculties reconciling the overall divorce and employment rates with the fact that there were very
few working women that were abused and very few non-abused women that divorced in the latter
sample.
22In particular, we estimated the model with up to four points of support for both employment and marriage, with
and without correlations between marriage, employment, and abuse. We also estimated a version of the model with
unobserved, but no observed, heterogeneity. The latter was the only case in which the model indicated there was
more than one point of support for marriage and employment.
24To further assess the importance of dynamics in the divorce and abuse decisions, we also consider
the ability of the static model to match the transitions in the data.23 The static model matches
the abuse rates and fractions married reasonably well in each stage, as illustrated in Table C1.
The former is not surprising, as the estimates suggest that the deterrent eﬀect of divorce on the
abuse decisions of husbands is small in magnitude. The static model does fails to match the data,
especially for young women, along two important dimensions. First, the static model overestimates
divorce rates. Second, the static model has diﬃculties matching the employment rates of married
and divorced women, especially for married women who are abused. The static version of the model
fails in these respects because it is unable to capture the eﬀects of state dependence in abuse on
the husband’s decision to abuse in the future. Abused women in the static model do not take into
account the fact that husbands that were abusive in the past are insensitive to the employment
decision of their wives when deciding whether to abuse again. As a result some abused women
attempt to prevent abuse by remaining married and working. In the dynamic model, abused women
take into account the strong state dependence in abuse and realize that the best they can do to
prevent further abuse is to divorce.
4.2 Policy Experiments
A major advantage of constructing and estimating a behavioral model of domestic violence, employ-
ment, and divorce is that we can consider a variety of policy experiments aimed at reducing domestic
violence. Several policy initiatives already exist in many countries that are designed to help women
leave abusive marriages. Shelters, counselling services, and abuse telephone hot-lines, for example,
are oﬀered extensively as a means of lowering the costs to women of leaving abusive relationships.
Other strategies, such as tougher laws prohibiting domestic violence and mandatory programs de-
signed to re-socialize abusive spouses, have been adopted to increase the costs of domestic violence
to abusers. There has also been much discussion of the intergenerational eﬀects of domestic violence
and how policy might address this issue. In this section, we describe how one can translate such
policies into the parameters of our framework, and then assess the behavioral implications of four
policy experiments that address the aforementioned issues.
23Full estimation results on the static model are presented in Appendix B.
25The ﬁrst two experiments consider policies adopted widely in practice. As mentioned above,
several policies, such as providing shelters and counselling and legal services to abused women, have
been aimed at reducing the costs of leaving violent marriages. This type of policy is examined in
our model by reducing the female’s preference for marriage, if abused, by 50 percent. The results of
this experiment, reported in Table 9, suggest that such a policy would simultaneously increase the
number of divorces and reduce the prevalence of domestic violence. Reducing the tolerance for abuse
results in a 37, 10, and 47 percent increase in divorce rates in abusive marriages for the youngest to
oldest age groups, respectively. The increase in divorce reduces abuse rates through two channels.
The ﬁrst is that the higher likelihood of divorce following abuse serves as a deterrent eﬀect. The
second is that there are fewer continuing marriages with abusive husbands. Since men that were
abusive in the past are more likely to abuse again, abuse rates are lower because there are fewer
intact marriages with repeat abusers. As a result of both factors, abuse rates fall by as little as
10 percent for women aged 30 to 44 to as much as 85 percent for women aged 45 to 59. It is also
interesting to note that women who remain in abusive marriages after the policy change have higher
employment rates: as husbands prefer to abuse non-working wives, it may be that the women who
decide to remain married work to try and prevent abuse, even though working is not very likely
to prevent repeat abuse. For comparison purposes, we conduct the same experiment for the static
version of the model.24 Removing the possibility for women to prevent future abuse by working
within marriage results in an overstatement of the rise in divorce for women aged 30 to 44 and an
understatement of the rise in employment for abused married women, with the opposite trend for
older women.
The second experiment we consider is one designed to directly increase the costs of violence
to abusive spouses. Such policies could include longer prison sentences for domestic violence or
mandatory counselling programs for abusive men. We conduct the latter policy experiment within
the model by reducing the gains to repeat abuse by 50 percent. Results of this exercise are presented
in Table 10. While the fraction of women that initially marry does not change, and the divorce rate
does not change, this policy change serves as a substantial deterrent to abuse: the abuse rate falls
by approximately 45 percent for women under 45 and by 90 percent for women 45 years of age and
24Results are available in Table C2 of Appendix C.
26older. As consistent with the ﬁrst experiment, increasing the cost of abuse serves to increase the
employment rate of abused women aged 30-44. Before the policy change, women married to abusive
spouses are aware that previous abuse is the primary determinant of the husband’s current abuse
decision. Thus, her employment choice is unlikely to have a large eﬀect on his abuse decision. Now
that the eﬀect of repeat abuse has diminished, there are larger gains to working, as she is more likely
to be able to prevent future abuse while remaining married through employment than before the
policy change. In the static version of the model, 30 to 44 year old women that are married and
do not respond to the policy by working as in the dynamic case, as they do not take into account
the likelihood of being abused in the next period, nor their ability to change the likelihood of abuse
through employment.
The ﬁnal two experiments we consider are those designed to reduce the intergenerational eﬀects
of domestic violence. Such policies might be implemented in practice, for example, by re-socializing
children from abusive homes through counselling programs. We implement this policy in the model
by setting the family background preference parameters to zero. Results of these experiments are
presented in Tables 11 and 12 for women and men, respectively. Eliminating the eﬀect of a violent
family background on women’s marriage, divorce, and employment choices has virtually no impact
on behavior. Women are equally likely to marry, divorce, and work as in the baseline scenario.
Therefore, preventing future domestic violence by re-socializing women does not appear to be an
eﬀective strategy for combating domestic violence. In contrast, as illustrated in Table 12, men are
very responsive to the policy change. After re-socializing men from violent homes so that their
preferences over abuse are the same as those for men from non-violent homes, abuse rates fall by
between 26 percent and 48 percent as men from violent homes are no more likely to abuse than men
with non-violent backgrounds. Re-socialization has two impacts on domestic abuse: it prevents abuse
from occurring in the ﬁrst place, and since abuse is less likely to occur for the ﬁrst time, the large
eﬀects of repeat abuse are also diminished. The policy change has virtually no impact on marriage
rates, which is not surprising considering the high marriage rates in the baseline speciﬁcation and
the age range of the women in the sample. Although the aggregate divorce rate falls due to the
fall in the number of abusive spouses, the divorce rate conditional on the presence of abuse remains
unchanged as expected. It is interesting to note that the employment rates of abused women do not
27increase under this experiment: since the eﬀect of repeat abuse does not change, if the spouse does
decide to abuse, there is little she can do to prevent future abuse apart from divorce.
5 Conclusion
The relationship between domestic abuse, employment, and divorce is considered in this paper. The
dominant eﬀect of abuse on women’s behavior is through divorce, although some women prevent
abuse by working in non-abusive marriages. The evidence presented on the importance of abuse in
the divorce decision highlights the fact that many women observed in representative data respond
to domestic violence by leaving the relationship. This ﬁnding is in stark contrast to the conventional
notion of ‘learned helplessness,’ the portrayal of abused women as unable or unwilling to leave
violent relationships. The results highlight the strong intergenerational eﬀects of domestic violence,
as observing domestic violence as a child dramatically increases the likelihood of abusing one’s
wife. The results also suggest women’s employment decisions have a causal eﬀect on abuse, as
working women are less likely to be abused by their spouses. Although the results indicate a causal
eﬀect of employment on abuse, this is not true of the eﬀect of abuse on employment. Both the
stylized facts and the estimation results indicate that much of the lower employment rates of abused
women are explained by the fact that abused women tend to have characteristics, such as violent
family backgrounds and lower levels of education, that diﬀer substantially from those in non-violent
marriages and reduce the gains to working.
The policy experiments illustrate an important link between employment and domestic violence:
women can use employment as a means to prevent a ﬁrst incident of abuse in marriage. However,
once the marriage has become abusive, the only means for preventing future abuse is for women to
divorce their spouses. Overall, the most eﬀective policies for reducing abuse within marriage are
those that directly target the behavior of men. Re-socializing men from violent homes, in particular,
is a promising strategy for preventing domestic violence.
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28Table 1: Sample Statistics for Currently Married Sample, by Abuse
Variable No Abuse Abuse Prior to Abuse During
Past 12 Months Past 12 Months
Age 38.8601 40.4124 34.2700
(8.2438) (8.2133) (7.0419)
Age at ﬁrst 22.3040 21.3502 21.1906
marriage (3.8920) (3.6942) (4.4202)
Child 0.7409 0.7524 0.7644
(0.4382) (0.4333) (0.4290)
High school 0.3307 0.2284 0.4448
(0.4706) (0.4214) (0.5024)
Post-secondary or 0.4838 0.3902 0.2977
university (0.4998) (0.4897) (0.4623)
Violence in family 0.1599 0.3298 0.3624
background (0.3665) (0.4720) (0.4860)
Violence in current 0.0847 0.3518 0.5743
spouse’s family (0.2785) (0.4794) (0.4999)
Don’t know current spouse’s 0.0671 0.1624 0.0274
family background (0.2502) (0.3703) (0.1651)
Spouse was unemployed 0.1120 0.2275 0.2990
(0.3154) (0.4208) (0.4629)
Spouse worked 52 weeks 0.7866 0.6721 0.5700
(0.4097) (0.4713) (0.5005)
Spouse has high school 0.2711 0.2539 0.2923
(0.4446) (0.4670) (0.4599)
Spouse has post-secondary 0.2774 0.3288 0.2139
(0.4478) (0.4716) (0.4146)
Spouse has university 0.2055 0.0708 0.0172
(0.4041) (0.2576) (0.1314)
Observations 4386 129 46
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
29Table 2: Marriage, Divorce, Abuse, and Employment Behavior
Marital Status No Current Abuse Current Abuse
Employed Not Employed Employed Not Employed
Not abused prior to the past 12 months
Married 50.79 35.05 0.07 0.07
(50.00) (47.71) (2.63) (2.58)
Divorced 3.61 1.22
(18.65) (10.98)
Abused prior to the past 12 months
Married 35.72 24.34 3.48 2.52
(47.96) (42.96) (18.33) (15.68)
Divorced 20.43 13.52
(40.36) (34.22)
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
30Table 3: Preference Parameters for Husbands
Wife Aged Wife Aged Wife Aged
15-29 30-44 45-59
Non-working Wife 3.9242 2.0461 3.1027
(1.8002) (1.9157) (3.2403)
Working Wife -5.9015 0.0619 -2.5854
(2.0540) (2.0239) (3.3102)










Abuse Loading Factor -0.6817
(0.2158)
Log-likelihood value -9540.6641
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Not abusive is the base category.
31Table 4: Preference Parameters for Wives
Single Married Married Divorced
Working Not Working Working Working
Women Aged 15 to 30
Abusive spouse -1.6923 -1.9999 -0.0524
(0.2352) (0.3316) (0.3306)
Female has violent 0.1184 0.4086 -0.3981
background (0.1599) (0.1226) (0.4586)
Child -1.3698 0.0116 0.2470
(0.2640) (0.1461) (0.1492)
High school 1.2700 0.2150 0.4819
(0.3404) (0.1422) (0.1500)
Post secondary 1.7070 0.2573 0.7392
(0.3366) (0.1496) (0.1530)
Women Aged 30 to 45
Abusive spouse -2.9041 -2.1256 -0.3955
(0.2543) (0.2467) (0.2594)
Female has violent -0.2589 -0.3577 -0.3523
background (0.1341) (0.1336) (0.1332)
Child -1.1637 0.2909 -0.5095
(0.1472) (0.1643) (0.1522)
High school 0.9646 0.0393 0.5714
(0.1560) (0.1434) (0.1596)
Post secondary 1.6165 0.4873 1.0977
(0.1603) (0.1527) (0.1712)
Age 0.4625 0.6149 1.2685 1.0083
(0.3649) (0.2018) (0.2052) (0.4056)
Log-likelihood value -9540.6641
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Single, not working is the base category.
32Table 5: Preference Parameters for Wives, Continued
Single Married Married Divorced
Working Not Working Working Working
Women Aged 45 to 60
Abusive spouse -3.6152 -4.5195 -0.7800
(1.9939) (2.0318) (3.0645)
Female has violent -0.1353 -0.4107 -0.7432
background (0.1716) (0.2809) (0.3169)
Child -1.3416 -0.4449 0.3826
(0.2024) (0.3253) (0.3608)
High school 0.1194 -0.1881 0.8313
(0.2157) (0.5385) (0.5739)
Post secondary -0.0805 -1.0521 0.2461
(0.2184) (0.4356) (0.4829)
Age 11.7319 2.1079 1.1194 1.5906
(0.6404) (2.0031) (2.0910) (1.8614)
Intercepts
-0.7293 8.3840 -15.5581 -0.3778





Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Single, not working is the base category.
33Table 6: Preference Parameters for Wives, Continued
Unobserved Heterogeneity
Working, Type I -0.1873
(0.1299)
Probability 0.2757
Married, Type I 0.1049
(6.6726)
Probability 0.8954
Probability Unknown Spousal Type is Violent Family Background 0.5975
Log-likelihood value -9540.6641
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Single, not working is the base category.
34Table 7: Comparison of Couples with Diﬀering Characteristics
A B C D
Violent Backgrounds No Yes Yes Yes
Wife has Post-Secondary Education Yes Yes No No
Couple has Children No No No Yes
Age 15 to 29
Fraction Married 0.5795 0.5760 0.6899 0.4432
Divorce Rate in Abusive Marriages 0.6597 0.6567 0.5984 0.3972
Divorce Rate in Non-Abusive Marriages 0.1830 0.1852 0.1553 0.0798
Employment Rate for Single/Divorced Women 0.7996 0.8178 0.7217 0.3670
Employment Rate for Married Women 0.6571 0.5247 0.4614 0.4432
Abuse Rate 0.0392 0.1835 0.2090 0.2090
Age 30 to 44
Fraction Married 0.6918 0.6533 0.6874 0.8372
Divorce Rate in Abusive Marriages 0.3964 0.4054 0.4527 0.3438
Divorce Rate in Non-Abusive Marriages 0.1057 0.1783 0.2046 0.1565
Employment Rate for Single/Divorced Women 0.8950 0.8641 0.7483 0.4605
Employment Rate for Married Women 0.8315 0.8574 0.8339 0.6230
Abuse Rate 0.0019 0.0130 0.0103 0.0137
Age 45 to 59
Fraction Married 0.7431 0.6225 0.5492 0.9736
Divorce Rate in Abusive Marriages 0.8022 0.8947 0.7600 0.6694
Divorce Rate in Non-Abusive Marriages 0.0268 0.0445 0.0171 0.0061
Employment Rate for Single/Divorced Women 0.8694 0.8126 0.8290 0.3205
Employment Rate for Married Women 0.6329 0.6225 0.5492 0.6269
Abuse Rate 0.0072 0.0070 0.0085 0.0077
35Table 8: Comparison of Actual and Predicted Choices
Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
Age 15 to 29 Age 30 to 44
Fraction Married 0.8075 0.8112 0.8870 0.8835
Divorce Rate in Abusive Marriages 0.4950 0.5177 0.0788 0.0937
Divorce Rate in Non-Abusive Marriages 0.1350 0.1299 0.0088 0.0645
Employment Rate for Single/Divorced Women 0.7040 0.6782 0.6990 0.7074
Employment Rate for Married Women 0.6179 0.5873 0.5906 0.6010
Employment Rate for Abused Married Women 0.5869 0.7608
Employment Rate for Non-Abused Married Women 0.5714 0.5791
Abuse Rate 0.0731 0.0661 0.0326 0.0388
Fraction of Working Wives that are Abused 0.0242 0.0153 0.0075 0.0784
Fraction of Non-Working Wives that are Abused 0.0328 0.0829 0.0081 0.0188
Age 45 to 59
Fraction Married 0.9069 0.8814
Divorce Rate in Abusive Marriages 0.5917 0.6448
Divorce Rate in Non-Abusive Marriages 0.0000 0.0175
Employment Rate for Divorced Women 0.5887 0.5870
Employment Rate for Married Women 0.5850 0.5786
Employment Rate for Abused Married Women 0.5088 0.4955
Employment Rate for Non-Abused Married Women 0.5870 0.5514
Abuse Rate 0.0257 0.0151
Fraction of Working Wives that are Abused 0.0227 0.0127
Fraction of Non-Working Wives that are Abused 0.0299 0.0200
36Table 9: Experiment 1: Reduce Wife’s Tolerance for Abuse by 50 percent
Baseline Policy Baseline Policy
Age 15 to 29 Age 30 to 44
Fraction Married 0.8112 0.8066 0.8835 0.8850
Divorce Rate in Abusive Marriages 0.5177 0.7294 0.0937 0.1034
Divorce Rate in Non-Abusive Marriages 0.1299 0.1330 0.0645 0.0632
Employment Rate for Single/Divorced Women 0.6782 0.6734 0.7074 0.7104
Employment Rate for Married Women 0.5873 0.5914 0.6010 0.6005
Employment Rate for Abused Married Women 0.3392 0.3279 0.7608 0.9381
Employment Rate for Non-Abused Married Women 0.6032 0.5985 0.5791 0.5730
Abuse Rate 0.0661 0.0490 0.0388 0.0341
Fraction of Working Wives that are Abused 0.0153 0.0055 0.0784 0.0906
Fraction of Non-Working Wives that are Abused 0.0829 0.0505 0.0188 0.0073
Age 45 to 59
Fraction Married 0.8814 0.8732
Divorce Rate in Abusive Marriages 0.6448 0.9500
Divorce Rate in Non-Abusive Marriages 0.0175 0.0177
Employment Rate for Divorced Women 0.5870 0.5556
Employment Rate for Married Women 0.5786 0.5781
Employment Rate for Abused Married Women 0.4955 0.7345
Employment Rate for Non-Abused Married Women 0.5514 0.5516
Abuse Rate 0.0151 0.0023
Fraction of Working Wives that are Abused 0.0127 0.0026
Fraction of Non-Working Wives that are Abused 0.0200 0.0063
37Table 10: Experiment 2: Reducing the Gains to Repeat Abuse by 50 percent for
Abusive Men
Baseline Policy Baseline Policy
Age 15 to 29 Age 30 to 44
Fraction Married 0.8112 0.8149 0.8835 0.8966
Divorce Rate in Abusive Marriages 0.5177 0.5172 0.0937 0.0765
Divorce Rate in Non-Abusive Marriages 0.1299 0.1329 0.0645 0.0502
Employment Rate for Single/Divorced Women 0.6782 0.6738 0.7074 0.7261
Employment Rate for Married Women 0.5873 0.5897 0.6010 0.5935
Employment Rate for Abused Married Women 0.3392 0.3555 0.7608 0.9193
Employment Rate for Non-Abused Married Women 0.6032 0.5957 0.5791 0.5739
Abuse Rate 0.0661 0.0387 0.0388 0.0199
Fraction of Working Wives that are Abused 0.0153 0.0012 0.0784 0.0463
Fraction of Non-Working Wives that are Abused 0.0829 0.0399 0.0188 0.0036
Age 45 to 59
Fraction Married 0.8814 0.8991
Divorce Rate in Abusive Marriages 0.6448 0.5491
Divorce Rate in Non-Abusive Marriages 0.0175 0.0111
Employment Rate for Divorced Women 0.5870 0.6108
Employment Rate for Married Women 0.5786 0.5714
Employment Rate for Abused Married Women 0.4955 0.4955
Employment Rate for Non-Abused Married Women 0.5514 0.5478
Abuse Rate 0.0151 0.0015
Fraction of Working Wives that are Abused 0.0127 0.0016
Fraction of Non-Working Wives that are Abused 0.0200 0.0051
38Table 11: Experiment 3: Eliminate the Eﬀect of Family Background on Wife’s
Preferences over Marriage and Employment
Baseline Policy Baseline Policy
Age 15 to 29 Age 30 to 44
Fraction Married 0.8112 0.8103 0.8835 0.8872
Divorce Rate in Abusive Marriages 0.5177 0.5373 0.0937 0.0929
Divorce Rate in Non-Abusive Marriages 0.1299 0.1320 0.0645 0.0587
Employment Rate for Single/Divorced Women 0.6782 0.6664 0.7074 0.7220
Employment Rate for Married Women 0.5873 0.6165 0.6010 0.5981
Employment Rate for Abused Married Women 0.3392 0.3746 0.7608 0.7559
Employment Rate for Non-Abused Married Women 0.6032 0.6249 0.5791 0.5769
Abuse Rate 0.0661 0.0580 0.0388 0.0367
Fraction of Working Wives that are Abused 0.0153 0.0135 0.0784 0.0787
Fraction of Non-Working Wives that are Abused 0.0829 0.0713 0.0188 0.0207
Age 45 to 59
Fraction Married 0.8814 0.8831
Divorce Rate in Abusive Marriages 0.6448 0.6315
Divorce Rate in Non-Abusive Marriages 0.0175 0.0148
Employment Rate for Divorced Women 0.5870 0.5703
Employment Rate for Married Women 0.5786 0.5911
Employment Rate for Abused Married Women 0.4955 0.4941
Employment Rate for Non-Abused Married Women 0.5514 0.5645
Abuse Rate 0.0151 0.0148
Fraction of Working Wives that are Abused 0.0127 0.0129
Fraction of Non-Working Wives that are Abused 0.0200 0.0207
39Table 12: Experiment 4: Eliminate the Eﬀect of Family Background on Husband’s
Predilection for Abuse
Baseline Policy Baseline Policy
Age 15 to 29 Age 30 to 44
Fraction Married 0.8112 0.8155 0.8835 0.8893
Divorce Rate in Abusive Marriages 0.5177 0.5107 0.0937 0.0989
Divorce Rate in Non-Abusive Marriages 0.1299 0.1303 0.0645 0.0583
Employment Rate for Single/Divorced Women 0.6782 0.6771 0.7074 0.7082
Employment Rate for Married Women 0.5873 0.5848 0.6010 0.6007
Employment Rate for Abused Married Women 0.3392 0.3534 0.7608 0.7250
Employment Rate for Non-Abused Married Women 0.6032 0.5935 0.5791 0.5831
Abuse Rate 0.0661 0.0495 0.0388 0.0219
Fraction of Working Wives that are Abused 0.0153 0.0079 0.0784 0.0437
Fraction of Non-Working Wives that are Abused 0.0829 0.0615 0.0188 0.0093
Age 45 to 59
Fraction Married 0.8814 0.8909
Divorce Rate in Abusive Marriages 0.6448 0.6680
Divorce Rate in Non-Abusive Marriages 0.0175 0.0168
Employment Rate for Divorced Women 0.5870 0.6112
Employment Rate for Married Women 0.5786 0.5762
Employment Rate for Abused Married Women 0.4955 0.4257
Employment Rate for Non-Abused Married Women 0.5514 0.5527
Abuse Rate 0.0151 0.0078
Fraction of Working Wives that are Abused 0.0127 0.0059




mh mn sh sn
a n a n n
sn sh
n
mh mn sh sn
a n a n n
a
mh mn sh sn
a n a n n
n
mh mn sh sn
a n a n n
41Figure 1: Decision Tree for Single Women at the Beginning of Stages 2-4
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43Figure 2: Decision Tree for Married Women at the Beginning of Stages 2-4
44A Comparison of Average Characteristics for the Violence
Against Women and 1993 Survey of Consumer Finances
Samples
Table A1 compares similar samples from the VAWS and the 1993 SCF, a supplement of the Canadian
Labor Force Survey similar to the March Current Population Survey in the U.S., to assess the
representativeness of the VAWS. Both samples are limited to women between the ages of 25 and 55
who are not attending school. The average characteristics of women in the VAWS and SCF data
are similar, with three exceptions. First, total spousal income is higher in the SCF. It is likely
that the measure of spousal income reported from the VAWS is inaccurate, as spousal income was
constructed as the diﬀerence between the categorical variables“Total Personal Income” and “Total
Household Income.” Second, the proportion of women residing in an urban area is higher in the
SCF. It should be noted that P.E.I. was not assigned a “Rural/Urban” indicator in the VAWS, and
was thus coded as “Rural”. Finally, the proportion of women with some post-secondary education
is higher in the SCF and the proportions of women with high school and university degrees is lower.
This latter diﬀerence could stem from coding or non-response pattern diﬀerences across the data
sets. However, given the many similarities between the VAWS and the SCF especially in terms of
employment patterns,25 it does not appear the high non-response rate for the VAWS resulted in an
unrepresentative sample.
25In the VAWS, full-time employment applies to respondents reporting full-time work in the past year; in the SCF
full-time employment applies to those reporting ‘mostly’ working full-time in the reference year.
45Table A1 Comparison of Average Characteristics for the Violence Against Women
Survey and the Survey of Consumer Finances (1993) Samples
Variable SCF93 (1992 Income) VAW (1993)
Married 0.7643 0.7362
(0.4245) (0.4407)
Total personal income 20,448.48 21,933.72
(130.0261) (214.0748)
Total spousal income 39,439.08 30,404.59
(286.5227) (257.1105)
Age of respondent 38.6668 38.9941
(0.0582) (0.1038)
Respondent resides in Nﬂd., N.S., 0.0819 0.0859
N.B. or P.E.I. (0.0019) (0.0034)
Respondent resides in Quebec 0.2555 0.2694
(0.0030) (0.0054)
Respondent resides in Ontario 0.3793 0.3624
(0.0034) (0.0059)
Respondent resides in AB., SK., 0.1575 0.1657
or MN. (0.0025) (0.0045)
Respondent resides in B.C. 0.1191 0.1165
(0.0022) (0.0039)
Respondent resides in an urban area3 0.8260 0.7456
(0.0026) (0.0053)
Highest level of education is less 0.2311 0.2071
than high school (0.0029) (0.0050)
Highest level of education is 0.2632 0.3197
high school (0.0030) (0.0057)
Highest level of education includes 0.3571 0.2964
some post-secondary education (0.0033) (0.0056)
Highest level of education is a 0.1486 0.1767
university degree (0.0025) (0.0047)
Respondent worked in the reference year 0.7882 0.7685
(0.0028) (0.0052)
Respondent worked or looked for work 0.8129 0.8165
in the reference year (0.0027) (0.0047)
Number of weeks worked for respondents 0.8767 0.8906
who reported working (0.0020) (0.0033)
Respondent worked full-time4 0.7652 0.7365
(0.0036) (0.0061)
Respondent worked part-time 0.2212 0.2635
(0.0035) (0.0061)
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
46B Estimation Results for Myopic Model
47Table B1 Preference Parameters for Wives
Single Married Married Divorced
Working Not Working Working Working
Women Aged 15 to 30
Abusive spouse -2.1424 -1.0118 -0.3195
(0.3127) (4.1563) (0.2234)
Female has violent -0.2967 0.1557 -0.7436
background (0.1505) (0.1015) (3.3096)
Child -2.9033 0.3670 -0.8190
(0.2987) (0.0843) (3.4286)
High school 0.8156 -0.0609 -0.1208
(0.0742) (0.1707) (1.9554)
Post secondary 1.2236 0.0951 -34.0461
(0.0746) (0.0695) (29.4153)
Women Aged 30 to 45
Abusive spouse -3.6006 -1.9841 -0.4942
(0.3967) (0.7271) (0.2050)
Female has violent 0.1567 -0.0068 0.1489
background (0.0940) (0.1051) (0.0804)
Child -0.6460 1.8845 0.7469
(0.1652) (0.1050) (0.0970)
High school 1.2213 0.0193 0.6505
(0.0946) (0.1036) (0.1085)
Post secondary 2.1701 0.6695 1.4167
(0.0906) (0.1032) (0.1021)
Age 1.0027 -0.6336 -0.0470 -0.8950
(0.1369) (0.2209) (0.1354) (0.1272)
Log-likelihood value -9737.7022
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Single, not working is the base category.
48Table B1 Preference Parameters for Wives, Continued
Single Married Married Divorced
Working Not Working Working Working
Women Aged 45 to 60
Abusive spouse -6.1962 -6.7566 -1.0618
(0.4106) (0.5811) (0.3014)
Female has violent 2.6223 -1.6732 0.2397
background (0.3065) (0.1446) (0.4610)
Child 0.3532 1.3047 2.5500
(0.3515) (0.2287) (0.0982)
High school 2.5993 -0.2300 1.3028
(0.5465) (0.3828) (0.4013)
Post secondary 2.6223 -1.6732 0.2397
(0.3713) (0.1460) (0.2638)
Age 1.0027 4.1320 1.9935 -0.8950
(0.1369) (0.2428) (0.3253) (0.1272)
Intercepts
0.6755 1.9812 -26.9644 0.0478





Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Single, not working is the base category.
49Table B1 Preference Parameters for Wives, Continued
Unobserved Heterogeneity
Working, Type I -2.3288
(8.0000)
Probability 0.2606
Married, Type I 0.0008
(12.2243)
Probability 0.0478
Probability Unknown Spousal Type is Violent Family Background 0.5928
Log-likelihood value -9737.7022
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Single, not working is the base category.
50Table B2 Preference Parameters for Husbands
Wife Aged Wife Aged Wife Aged
15-29 30-44 45-59
Non-working Wife -0.7562 1.7018 -0.0656
(0.5178) (0.0439) (0.4199)
Working Wife 3.7407 2.9234 3.5345
(0.0945) (0.2776) (0.4563)










Abuse Loading Factor -2.9777
(0.0854)
Log-likelihood value -9737.7022
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Not abusive is the base category.
51C Simulation Results for Myopic Model
52Table C1 Comparison of Actual and Predicted Choices
Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
Age 15 to 29 Age 30 to 44
Fraction Married 0.8075 0.8054 0.8870 0.8887
Divorce Rate in Abusive Marriages 0.4950 0.5842 0.0788 0.0817
Divorce Rate in Non-Abusive Marriages 0.1350 0.1300 0.0088 0.0660
Employment Rate for Single/Divorced Women 0.7040 0.6681 0.6990 0.7402
Employment Rate for Married Women 0.6179 0.4593 0.5906 0.6291
Employment Rate for Abused Married Women 0.5869 0.8015
Employment Rate for Non-Abused Married Women 0.5714 0.6038
Abuse Rate 0.0731 0.0675 0.0326 0.0437
Fraction of Working Wives that are Abused 0.0242 0.0150 0.0075 0.0651
Fraction of Non-Working Wives that are Abused 0.0328 0.0618 0.0081 0.0174
Age 45 to 59
Fraction Married 0.9069 0.9565
Divorce Rate in Abusive Marriages 0.5917 0.5112
Divorce Rate in Non-Abusive Marriages 0.0000 0.0116
Employment Rate for Divorced Women 0.5887 0.7092
Employment Rate for Married Women 0.5850 0.5701
Employment Rate for Abused Married Women 0.5088 0.6062
Employment Rate for Non-Abused Married Women 0.5870 0.5304
Abuse Rate 0.0257 0.0251
Fraction of Working Wives that are Abused 0.0227 0.0208
Fraction of Non-Working Wives that are Abused 0.0299 0.0350
53Table C2 Experiment 1: Reduce Wife’s Tolerance for Abuse by 50%
Baseline Policy Baseline Policy
Age 15 to 29 Age 30 to 44
Fraction Married 0.8054 0.7988 0.8887 0.8888
Divorce Rate in Abusive Marriages 0.5842 0.7604 0.0817 0.1907
Divorce Rate in Non-Abusive Marriages 0.1300 0.1302 0.0660 0.0648
Employment Rate for Single/Divorced Women 0.6681 0.6538 0.7402 0.7361
Employment Rate for Married Women 0.4593 0.4671 0.6291 0.6251
Employment Rate for Abused Married Women 0.2012 0.2645 0.8015 0.8407
Employment Rate for Non-Abused Married Women 0.4616 0.4639 0.6038 0.5991
Abuse Rate 0.0675 0.0591 0.0437 0.0285
Fraction of Working Wives that are Abused 0.0150 0.0142 0.0651 0.0492
Fraction of Non-Working Wives that are Abused 0.0618 0.0353 0.0174 0.0079
Age 45 to 59
Fraction Married 0.9565 0.9593
Divorce Rate in Abusive Marriages 0.5112 0.6582
Divorce Rate in Non-Abusive Marriages 0.0116 0.0108
Employment Rate for Divorced Women 0.7092 0.6768
Employment Rate for Married Women 0.5701 0.5780
Employment Rate for Abused Married Women 0.6062 0.9595
Employment Rate for Non-Abused Married Women 0.5304 0.5315
Abuse Rate 0.0251 0.0153
Fraction of Working Wives that are Abused 0.0208 0.0166
Fraction of Non-Working Wives that are Abused 0.0350 0.0207
54Table C3 Experiment 2: Reducing the Gains to Repeat Abuse by 50%
for Abusive Men
Baseline Policy Baseline Policy
Age 15 to 29 Age 30 to 44
Fraction Married 0.8054 0.8060 0.8887 0.9004
Divorce Rate in Abusive Marriages 0.5842 0.5757 0.0817 0.1290
Divorce Rate in Non-Abusive Marriages 0.1300 0.1323 0.0660 0.0519
Employment Rate for Single/Divorced Women 0.6681 0.6716 0.7402 0.7546
Employment Rate for Married Women 0.4593 0.4563 0.6291 0.6180
Employment Rate for Abused Married Women 0.2012 0.1943 0.8015 0.8236
Employment Rate for Non-Abused Married Women 0.4616 0.4655 0.6038 0.5972
Abuse Rate 0.0675 0.0510 0.0437 0.0247
Fraction of Working Wives that are Abused 0.0150 0.0040 0.0651 0.0467
Fraction of Non-Working Wives that are Abused 0.0618 0.0179 0.0174 0.0081
Age 45 to 59
Fraction Married 0.9565 0.9633
Divorce Rate in Abusive Marriages 0.5112 0.4854
Divorce Rate in Non-Abusive Marriages 0.0116 0.0118
Employment Rate for Divorced Women 0.7092 0.7217
Employment Rate for Married Women 0.5701 0.5691
Employment Rate for Abused Married Women 0.6062 0.7182
Employment Rate for Non-Abused Married Women 0.5304 0.5301
Abuse Rate 0.0251 0.0078
Fraction of Working Wives that are Abused 0.0208 0.0050
Fraction of Non-Working Wives that are Abused 0.0350 0.0200
55Table C4 Experiment 3: Eliminate the Eﬀect of Family Background on
Wife’s Preferences over Marriage and Employment
Baseline Policy Baseline Policy
Age 15 to 29 Age 30 to 44
Fraction Married 0.8054 0.8032 0.8887 0.8884
Divorce Rate in Abusive Marriages 0.5842 0.5823 0.0817 0.0950
Divorce Rate in Non-Abusive Marriages 0.1300 0.1353 0.0660 0.0648
Employment Rate for Single/Divorced Women 0.6681 0.6762 0.7402 0.7351
Employment Rate for Married Women 0.4593 0.4674 0.6291 0.6227
Employment Rate for Abused Married Women 0.2012 0.2163 0.8015 0.8000
Employment Rate for Non-Abused Married Women 0.4616 0.4810 0.6038 0.5981
Abuse Rate 0.0675 0.0656 0.0437 0.0428
Fraction of Working Wives that are Abused 0.0150 0.0185 0.0651 0.0620
Fraction of Non-Working Wives that are Abused 0.0618 0.0584 0.0174 0.0177
Age 45 to 59
Fraction Married 0.9565 0.9596
Divorce Rate in Abusive Marriages 0.5112 0.4900
Divorce Rate in Non-Abusive Marriages 0.0116 0.0102
Employment Rate for Divorced Women 0.7092 0.7013
Employment Rate for Married Women 0.5701 0.5785
Employment Rate for Abused Married Women 0.6062 0.5799
Employment Rate for Non-Abused Married Women 0.5304 0.5397
Abuse Rate 0.0251 0.0243
Fraction of Working Wives that are Abused 0.0208 0.0204
Fraction of Non-Working Wives that are Abused 0.0350 0.0335
56Table C5 Experiment 4: Eliminate the Eﬀect of Family Background on
Husband’s Predilection for Abuse
Baseline Policy Baseline Policy
Age 15 to 29 Age 30 to 44
Fraction Married 0.8054 0.8095 0.8887 0.8938
Divorce Rate in Abusive Marriages 0.5842 0.5668 0.0817 0.0746
Divorce Rate in Non-Abusive Marriages 0.1300 0.1326 0.0660 0.0590
Employment Rate for Single/Divorced Women 0.6681 0.6796 0.7402 0.7454
Employment Rate for Married Women 0.4593 0.4505 0.6291 0.6222
Employment Rate for Abused Married Women 0.2012 0.1951 0.8015 0.8048
Employment Rate for Non-Abused Married Women 0.4616 0.4576 0.6038 0.6021
Abuse Rate 0.0675 0.0477 0.0437 0.0246
Fraction of Working Wives that are Abused 0.0150 0.0100 0.0651 0.0311
Fraction of Non-Working Wives that are Abused 0.0618 0.0437 0.0174 0.0070
Age 45 to 59
Fraction Married 0.9565 0.9643
Divorce Rate in Abusive Marriages 0.5112 0.5316
Divorce Rate in Non-Abusive Marriages 0.0116 0.0118
Employment Rate for Divorced Women 0.7092 0.7482
Employment Rate for Married Women 0.5701 0.5681
Employment Rate for Abused Married Women 0.6062 0.5586
Employment Rate for Non-Abused Married Women 0.5304 0.5315
Abuse Rate 0.0251 0.0143
Fraction of Working Wives that are Abused 0.0208 0.0105
Fraction of Non-Working Wives that are Abused 0.0350 0.0238
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